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Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see 
where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are 
turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly 
where the voice must be coming from.  With your eyes again 
fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense 
of the source of the sound will return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect 
reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate 
auditory perception.  And this phenomenological observation is 
one that you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by 
the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to 
someone with or without visual contact with them. 
 A common assumption in most philosophical 
discussions of appearances and experience is that, when one 
does engage in just such reflection, the character of how things 
appear to one is just obvious to one.  Just this assumption seems 
to lie behind Ned Block’s comment 
…what is it that philosophers have called qualitative states?: As 
Louis Armstrong said when asked what jazz is, “If you got to ask, 
you ain’t never going to get to know.” 
It is implicit in much of the recent debate about the problems of 
explaining consciousness, in particular what has come to be 
called phenomenal consciousness, in purely naturalistic terms: 
although we may not be able to explain how such consciousness 
can arise within a physical world, we have a clear sense of what 
the problematic subject matter is just by focusing on one’s own 
case. 
 Now while the assumption is widespread, and in many 
ways seems sensible, it does raise a deep puzzle concerning the 
ways in which philosophers debate the nature of perception and 
perceptual appearances.  For it is clear in such debate that 
philosophers disagree, and that they disagree about the nature 
of appearances.  Some philosophers claim that it is just obvious 
that there aspects of your experience, say of your currently 
looking at this page, which are entirely independent of any 
aspect that you may perceive the mind-independent world to 
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have.  Others, however, are insistent that it is just obvious to us 
that our perceptual experiences of the world are purely 
representational or intentional, and that what it is like to be in 
such states is a matter of no more than how things are 
represented as being by those states.  It is difficult to interpret 
these disagreements as other than being disagreements about 
the nature of appearances, how things look, or feel, or taste to us 
when we explore the world around us.  Yet, if the nature of 
appearances really is just open to simple reflection, how can 
there be room for any serious disagreement?  Surely one can 
confirm or disconfirm any theory of appearances straight off.  
The persistence of disagreement would suggest that either the 
inner lives of philosophers are much more varied than we 
previously had reason to suspect, or that at least one party to 
the debate must be deeply confused. 
 Instead, I suggest that the fact that such disagreement 
does occur indicates that there is such conflict implies that even 
if the character of experience is obvious to us, it is not obvious 
how obvious it is.  To make sense of these different theories, we 
must interpret them as able to draw a contrast between the real 
nature of appearances and how their opponents may be misled 
in describing how such appearances seem.  And this thought 
raises the question whether we can find an appropriate common 
ground among parties to the dispute: some description of what 
experience is like which neutrally expresses how appearances 
seem to us.  We could then see the competing parties as 
attempting to give competing explanations of this common 
ground. 
 It is this interpretative task that I attempt to undertake 
in this paper.  I shall not offering any final or definitive account 
of the nature of perceptual experience or the relation between 
experience and perception in this talk.  On the other hand, the 
reader is sure to be able to find many such accounts in other 
discussions of perception.  It is more difficult, however, to 
discern the common root or the starting point for these 
incompatible accounts of the supposedly obvious, and that is 
why I trust there is sufficient interest in trying to find a suitable 
overview of the disagreements here. 
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1.  In recent discussion, the notion of qualia has dominated 
debate about the nature of sensory consciousness.  This has 
occurred particularly in the context of debate about the viability 
of a purely physicalist understanding of the mind.  A common 
view is that the intentional or representational properties of 
mind, those in virtue of which our thoughts are about objects or 
properties in the world around us, present no insuperable 
problem to a physicalist account of the mind.  In contrast, it has 
been suggested that the fact that we are conscious, and more 
specifically that we have sensory or phenomenal consciousness, 
has been thought inexplicable given the state of neurosciences 
and cognitive psychology.  Associated with posing the problem 
in this way is the thought that if we do have phenomenal 
consciousness, then such consciousness is not to be understood 
in representational terms. 
 I want first to focus critically on the notion of qualia 
since it stands in the way of our getting a proper over-view of 
the disagreements concerning the nature of perceptual 
experience.  Although many philosophers write as if it is simply 
obvious to us that there are qualia, and that we know what they 
are, I shall argue instead that this is all chimerical.  For the most 
common usage of the term ‘qualia’ is equivocal, and the most 
familiar means of elucidating the term, by a kind of inner 
ostension of one’s conscious states simply fails to pick out a 
unique target.  Furthermore, lying behind this confusion is a 
long-standing dispute about the nature of experience and our 
knowledge of it which needs to be made explicit before we can 
advance in our task of setting up a common framework for 
understanding the debate about perception. 
The term has been used in a number of different ways, but we 
would do well to start with the usage found in this passage from 
David Chalmers: 
…a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be 
in that mental state.  To put it another way, we can say that a 
mental state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated 
quality of experience.  These phenomenal feels are also known as 
phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short.1 
                                                
1 D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p.4. 
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So used, the term is intended to pick out in the most general 
and neutral way the various aspects of conscious episodes.  In 
taking conscious experience to be suitably evident to a reflective 
audience, philosophers often avoid any explicit or informative 
definition of the term ‘qualia’.  Indeed, it is sometimes 
suggested that no informative definition could be given.  
Instead, we are often offered a verbal equivalent of an inwardly 
directed gesture, which in the context of the discussion is 
intended to direct one’s attention on the appropriate subject 
matter.  While it is generally assumed that it is simply obvious to 
us then what qualia are to be taken to be, I shall argue that in 
fact the term is generally used equivocally, and that independent 
of some further clarification, we cannot determine how people 
are using the term. 
 We can trace the equivocation to the way in which we 
are introduced to the term.  A notable such example is provided 
by Daniel Dennett, in a discussion which more generally is 
hostile to the notion of qualia.  Despite Dennett’s hostility to 
the notion, his opponents have been happy to accept his initial 
elucidation of the notion right at the outset of his paper.  It is 
worth looking at in some detail: 
‘Qualia’ is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be 
more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us… Look at a 
glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you—the particular, 
personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale 
of your visual experience at the moment.  The way the milk tastes 
to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as 
you swallow is an auditory quale.  These various ‘properties of 
conscious experience’ are prime examples of qualia.2 
Now this gloss on what Dennett complains is ‘frustratingly 
elusive’ contains a central, and, I shall argue, significant 
problem: Dennett equivocates on the term ‘qualia’ even as he 
introduces it.  As the last sentence of the passage makes clear, 
and as the course of the paper it comes from also indicates, 
Dennett assumes, with many other authors, that we should use 
the term ‘qualia’ to pick out ‘properties of experience’.  We may 
think of seeing a glass, or more neutrally having a visual 
                                                
2 D. Dennett,  ‘Quining Qualia’, Consciousness and Contemporary 
Science, A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), p.42. 
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experience as of a glass, as being a state of mind, the having of 
an experience.  Someone who has such an experience thereby 
has the property of having an experience of a glass.  Qualia are 
then to be seen either as properties of properties—that is what it 
is like to have an experience of a glass is a property of having the 
property of having an experience of the glass.  Alternatively, we 
can think of the ways in which things seem to one as further 
determinations or specifications of the determinable, having an 
experience.    Each of the specific experiences that you might 
have: the feeling of the hardness of the chair beneath you, 
hearing the rustle of frustration around you, each are different 
ways of having an experience.  Qualia are then just these 
different ways of having experience.  However, Dennett does 
not stick with this usage, for the moment he gives us any 
concrete examples of qualia we seem to shift to something of an 
entirely different order to that of a property of an experience: 
for Dennett’s examples are themselves not properties of 
experiences, but properties of the objects we come to perceive.  
He writes first of the way the glass of milk looks to one, where 
the object which has the property is itself part of the world 
around us and not part of the mind, namely a glass.  Likewise, it 
is the particular quantity of milk which tastes some way to one, 
and the milk, one’s throat, (and lack of manners) all together 
which are responsible for the sound which Dennett picks out as 
a auditory quale.  But surely nothing can both be the property 
of an object independent of the mind and at the same time a 
way of having an experience.  So Dennett seems to have 
introduced just the wrong examples to indicate as ‘properties of 
experience’. 
 It is not difficult to see where the problematic ambiguity 
is introduced in the discussion.  For the phrase ‘the ways things 
seem to us’ is itself ambiguous. Dennett, and others, seek to 
introduce the term ‘qualia’ by reference to such English 
locutions for how things look, feel, sound or more generally 
appear.  But appearance talk is itself complex and hence allows 
for abstraction of terms in more than one way.  The different 
instructions for fixing on an example of a quale result from 
abstracting now in one way, and now in another. 
 For example, when I tell you: 
It looks to Dan as if there is a rosy-hued glass of milk 
before him 
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I may intend to emphasise how things are with Dan, and to 
contrast the fact that Dan has a certain kind of experience with 
the fact that Mary is asleep, or that Ben has an altogether 
different kind of experience.  So we can imagine that the 
following underlined aspect of the sentence would be up for 
substitution in contrasting the way Dan is, with how else he 
might have been: 
(1’)  It looks to Dan as if there is a rosy-hued glass of 
milk before him 
On the other hand, given that this is in fact a case in which Dan 
is perceiving the glass of milk, we might rather be interested in 
what aspects of the milk are evident to Dan.  In this case we 
may be interested that it is the specific shade that the milk has 
that is manifest to him, in contrast to the maker’s mark on the 
glass.  In that case, the following underlined aspect of the 
sentence would be open to substitution to contrast ways in 
which the situation might have differed: 
(1”)  It looks to Dan as if there is a rosy-hued glass of 
milk before him 
So in moving from talk of something appearing F to someone, 
to talk of appearances, qualities of experience or qualia, the loss 
in complexity of the semantic structure leaves one open to 
equivocation between properties of what appears and properties 
of what is appeared to.  Just such slippage occurs in the passage 
quoted from Dennett: within one paragraph we move from 
properties of experience to properties of the object of 
experience, the glass of milk, back to properties of experience 
again. 
 Dennett is not an isolated example of this shift, but 
perhaps we can make do with just one other more recent 
example. Fred Dretske, like Dennett, is hostile to a tradition of 
thought which sees qualia as presenting an insuperable problem 
for a naturalistic account of the mind.  In his monograph 
Naturalizing the Mind, Dretske puts forward ‘the 
Representational Thesis’ as his account of how the mind can be 
part of the natural order.  The thesis itself consists of two claims: 
‘(1) All mental facts are representational facts, and (2) All 
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representational facts are facts about informational functions.’3  When 
Dretske turns to the issues raised by conscious experience in the 
third lecture, he makes the following claim: 
The Representational Thesis identifies the qualities of 
experience—qualia—with the properties objects are representeds 
as having.4 
Whatever one thinks of the Representational Thesis itself, one 
ought to hesitate before accepting this identity claim as a 
consequence of it.  As the first half of the identity claim makes 
clear, qualia are assumed to be properties of experiences, 
properties of properties of one’s mind, or ways in which one 
may come to have an experience.  But Dretske, as with most 
philosophers who ascribe a representational content to 
experience, supposes that our experiences represent how objects 
independent of the mind are.  Such mind-independent objects 
cannot have properties which are properties of states of mind.  
So it is implausible to suppose that our experiences should 
represent mind-independent objects as having properties of 
states of mind.  Yet this manifest absurdity is what Dretske 
claims in this passage. 
 Well, if we try to reconstruct what Dretske might be 
trying to say here, we can see the same equivocation in play as 
in the Dennett.  Although Dretske starts the sentence by talking 
about qualities of experience, the only intelligible claim he 
could be making is one which identifies qualia understood as 
the properties objects appear to have with the properties our 
experiences represent those objects as having.  This thesis is 
perfectly intelligible, even if some people might find it mildly 
controversial. 
 On the other hand, one might think that this identity 
claim alone falls short of telling us much about what 
experiences are like, and how Dretske’s position differs from 
those who insist that there are qualia but who reject the 
                                                
3 F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1995), p.xiii. 
4 Op. Cit. p.65: ‘represents’ is Dretske’s term for sensory or 
phenomenal representation as opposed to conceptual representation—
the details of the distinction he draws has no import for the point 
made in the text. 
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Representational Thesis.  But the need for Dretske to link up 
claims about how objects may come to appear to have 
properties with claims about what our experience can be like is 
obscured for him by the use of the equivocal term ‘qualia’.  
Since he can now use it in one sense, now in another, it may 
seem as if he covers all angles at once. 
 This example not only increases our sample of equivocal 
uses, but directs us towards the significance of this slip of the 
pen.  For it would be mistaken to respond to this problem by 
claiming that we can easily re-interpret both authors so as to 
avoid any such equivocation and ambiguity.  A charitable 
response to these problems would no doubt be one which 
understood both authors as intending strictly just to talk about 
the properties of what experiences are like when they talk of 
qualia, and hence to re-interpret any passages where they slip 
into talking instead of the properties that objects appear to have.  
But one could undertake this interpretative task only if we could 
reconstruct the theses put forward solely in terms of properties 
of experience on the one hand, and properties that objects 
appear to have on the other.  Once we make the distinction we 
can see that the theories do not offer us any explicit account of 
how the two sets of properties are related, even though the 
equivocation between the two suggests that in interpreting the 
notion of qualia we are to understand that there should be some 
important relation between them. 
 Indeed, the need to do so can be made even more 
explicit by setting this issue in an historical context with which 
it is not normally associated, that between sense-datum theories 
of perception and so-called adverbial approaches.  Consider first 
this notorious passage from HH Price: 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt.  I can doubt 
whether it is a tomato that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted 
piece of wax.  I can doubt whether there is a material thing there 
at all…  One thing however I cannot doubt: that there exists a red 
patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a 
background of other colour-patches, and having a certain visual 
depth, and that this whole field of colour is presented to my 
consciousness…that something is red and round then and there I 
cannot doubt…that it now exists, and that I am conscious of it—
by me at least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be 
doubted…  This peculiar and ultimate manner of being present 
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to consciousness is called being given, and that which is thus 
present is called a datum.5 
Perhaps the most salient aspect of this picture of perception and 
experience are those aspects of it which used to be called ‘the 
act-object’ model of experience.  According to Price the 
occurrence of an experience involves a subject, a relation of 
being given which relates that subject to various objects, the 
data, which are presented or given to her.  Furthermore, Price is 
insistent that such objects will be present even in cases of 
illusion or hallucination, so at least some of these data are non-
physical. 
 However, the passage is of most concern to us for the 
kind of view of knowledge of experience that it expresses.  For 
Price seems to be of the view that one knows about the 
character of one’s experience, that some red bulgy thing is 
present to one’s mind, through attending to the object which is 
given in the experience, the red bulgy thing itself.  Indeed, like 
Moore before him, Price thinks that consciousness is entirely 
diaphanous, and hence that all differences between conscious 
states of mind are differences in the objects which those states 
can have.6  So, when one comes to know what one’s experience 
is like, and how it may differ from other conscious states one 
could have come to have, one does so through attending to the 
objects of awareness given to one through having such states. 
 In the middle of the twentieth century, sense-datum 
theories, as ‘act-object’ accounts of experience, provoked an 
alternative kind of account normally known as ‘adverbial’ 
theories of perception.  The epithet comes from a suggestion 
first made by CJ Ducasse, in response to Moore that: 
“blue,” “bitter,” “sweet,” etc., are names not of objects of 
experience nor of species of objects of experience but of species of 
experience itself.  What this means is perhaps made clearest by 
saying that to sense blue is then to sense bluely, just as to dance 
the waltz is to dance “waltzily” (i.e., in the manner called “to 
                                                
5 H. H. Price, Perception(London: Methuen, 1932), p.3. 
6 Moore’s opinion can be found in G. Moore,  ‘The Refutation of 
Idealism’, Philosophical Studies,  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1922); Price commits himself to the view op. cit. p. 5. 
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waltz”) to jump a leap is to jump “leapily” (i.e., in the manner 
called to leap) etc.7 
The primary motivation for such adverbialism is to avoid any 
commitment to the existence of non-physical objects of the sort 
that Price is happy to accept.  The assumption of such 
discussions is that a commitment to ways in which one 
experiences, as opposed to objects which one senses, cannot be 
thought objectionable since we will be committed to the 
existence of such states of mind, as long we are not eliminativist 
about the mind or sensory consciousness. 
 But the adverbialism which Ducasse favours goes 
beyond the purely negative thesis that we should not commit 
ourselves to the existence of non-physical objects of sense, to a 
contrasting picture both of the role that experience plays in our 
perception of the world, and how it can be that we come to be 
aware of our own experiences.  The key idea is that we should 
principally think of our experiences as effects upon us by the 
environment; which effects have a distinctive qualitative 
character, and which are such that they bring about beliefs 
about the environment.  Such states have sufficient dimensions 
of variation that there can be a reliable connection between 
environmental conditions which bring them about.  In turn 
such states will act as the causes of beliefs about the presence of 
such environmental conditions which reliably correlate with the 
states of affairs they are about.  We can think of our descriptions 
of experience as being of red, or of green triangles, or of musk, 
all as indicating the kind of cause which brings them about and 
correlatively the belief which they could reliably fix.  On this 
view, awareness of the objects of perception and how they 
appear to be is one thing—the mind is directed out at the 
world—and attention to one’s own experience another thing.  
The experience is a merely a causal intermediary between world 
and our knowledge of it, our awareness of experience requires 
directing attention not at the objects of sense, but rather within 
the mind.8 
                                                
7 C. Ducasse,  ‘Moore’s “Refutation of Idealism”‘, The Philosophy of 
GE Moore, P. A. Schilpp (ed.) (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1942), 
pp.232-3. 
8  Ducasse’s main concern, it must be said is with Moore’s contention 
that the object of consciousness in sensing is independent of the 
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 Now if we bracket for the moment a concern with the 
metaphysical status of the objects of sense, whether they can be 
non-physical or not, the contrasting attitudes towards 
knowledge of experience on Price’s view and on the 
adverbialism opposed to it offer us contrasting interpretations of 
the connection between the properties of what experiences are 
like, which we can come to be aware of, and the properties 
which objects appear to us to have.  For Price, there is nothing 
more to learn about the nature of one’s experience than to learn 
what objects, and what qualities of objects are given to one.  To 
learn about the properties of one’s experience just is to learn 
what properties objects are presented as having.  We might put 
this in terms of qualia by saying that on this view, qualia in the 
sense of the what-it-is-like properties of experience, qualia1 as 
one might say, are partly constituted by the properties which 
objects appear or are presented as having, qualia2.  And one 
comes to know what the qualia1 of one’s experience are, through 
knowing what the qualia2 of one’s experience are.  In contrast, 
for the adverbialist, properties of one’s experience need to be 
sharply distinguished from properties that objects appear to 
have: the properties objects appear to have, on the whole, are 
those which our experiences are liable to cause us to believe that 
they have.  The properties our experiences have, qualia1, are the 
properties which are responsible for our coming to acquire these 
beliefs, but they are distinct and our awareness of them is 
                                                                                                      
mind—and the dispute between Moore and Ducasse involves much 
talking past each other.  For a further development of adverbialism 
which takes on the elements described in the text, see R. Chisholm, 
Theory of Knowledge(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966), 
pp.91-98 and M. Tye, ‘The Adverbial Approach to Visual 
Experience’,  Philosophical Review XCIII, No. April(1984),195-225.  
This approach has its roots in Thomas Reid, see T. Reid,  ‘Essays on 
the Intellectual Powers of Man’, Inquiry and Essays, R. Beanblossom 
and K. Lehrer (eds.) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1983).  
Note that not all philosophers whose views on sensation have been 
classified as adverbialist have made the assumption about our 
knowledge of experience mentioned in the text, the most notable 
exception is Wilfrid Sellars, see ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind’, Science, Perception and Reality,  (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1963), and Science and Metaphysics (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1968). 
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distinct from our awareness of the properties that objects appear 
to have, qualia2. 
 If we look back to Dretske and Dennett, then we can see 
this controversy mirrored in what they have to say.  In Dretske’s 
case it is clear that the conception of knowledge of experience is 
closest to the sense-datum approach, although he is surely keen 
to avoid the metaphysical extravagances of that view: why the 
identity of qualia2 for him with the properties objects are 
represented as having may be relevant to the Representational 
Thesis is simply that if one accepts with Price that qualia2 
determine qualia1, and that we have knowledge of qualia1 
through knowledge of qualia2, he can claim that our knowledge 
of what experience is like is simply knowledge of how it 
represents things to be, and hence knowledge of its 
representational properties. 
 With Dennett, on the other hand, it is clear what we 
could interpret the passage in either way.  For if one sides with 
the adverbialist then, given the close correlations between 
properties objects can be perceived to have and the experiences 
to which those objects give rise, one might imagine that thought 
of the one would be liable to bring to mind the other.  Dennett 
can be seen as employing a form of metonymy, in mentioning 
the properties the glass of milk may be perceived to have, he 
enables his audience to latch on instead to the distinct set of 
properties which one’s experiences would have, were one 
perceiving the milk.  Furthermore, since there is no obvious 
vocabulary for the qualities of experience so conceived, one 
might think that this is the most natural and obvious way to 
introduce such ineffable aspects of the mind into conversation. 
 It is clear that there is a substantive disagreement here 
over the nature of qualia, even when we restrict that term simply 
to mean the what-it-is-like properties of experience.  The 
instructions provided for simply directing one’s attention to 
these elusive properties are inadequate to the task of settling 
which account is the right one; yet the terms in which 
philosophers discuss these matters tend to equivocate, now 
between talk of properties of experience, now properties of 
objects; and the ways in which they talk slip between supporting 
one account of the relation of these properties, and now 
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supporting the other.9  I suggest it is no accident that these two 
things come together.  As long we simply equivocate over the 
use of the term ‘qualia’ we can hide from ourselves the need for 
answering the difficult question how the properties of 
experience relate to the properties which things appear to have. 
 
 
2.  The issue here is substantive, but how are we to settle it?  
Well, the idea that our conception of what our experience is like 
and our conception of what properties objects appear to us to 
have might be separate is attractive only as long as we look at 
the simplest of descriptions of experience: for example a visual 
experience of a red bulgy thing; an experience of a bitter or 
tangy thing.  There seems to be nothing about these 
descriptions that should make us prefer one account over 
another.  But when we look to more complex cases, we see that 
the description of what is apparent to us is not independent of 
our appreciation of what experience is like, and that for some 
aspects of experience it is difficult to conceive of what they 
could be independent of how things appear to us.  Proper 
attention to experience, I suggest, shows that the adverbialist 
conception of our knowledge of experience is in the end 
unintelligible. 
                                                
9 Paul Boghossian suggested to me that one could define a perfectly 
good notion of qualia without this threat of equivocation: qualia just 
are the non-representational properties of the mind which make a 
difference to what it is like to be one.  We can determine whether 
there are any qualia, simply by asking whether two individuals could 
differ with respect to what it is like to be them without differing in 
their representational properties.  However, the problem with this 
suggestion concerns how we are to apply the test: for in order to use 
the test within a thought experiment we need to determine when two 
individuals are to be considered as sharing all the same 
representational properties.  This we cannot do without attending to 
the properties which things appear to them to have.  This, somewhat 
indirect, test for the existence of qualia implicitly exploits the kind of 
direct test discussed in the text: we are either meant to recognise those 
aspects of consciousness which are purely representational or those 
which are not.  So the problem of what one is to direct a subject’s 
attention to, when their attention is directed to the qualitative aspects 
of sensory experience remains. 
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 To focus on a concrete example, consider the following 
passage from a discussion of the nature of shadows by the art 
theorist Michael Baxandall: 
I am writing this at a table with a wall each side of it, on a day of 
mixed sun and cloud.  The wall on the right is modern, made of 
brick, and painted white with a matte but even emulsion paint.  
At the base of the wall the paint is blistering from damp.  The 
wall on the left is much older, rough-cast rendering over 
undressed sandstone masonry, and there have been various 
attempts to patch gaps in the rendering with cement of various 
consistencies.  It too is painted white, but with a rougher sand-
textured stuff.  This is flaking off in places due to an impermeable 
white flint element in the rough-cast; and in some but not all of 
these places desultory touching up has been done with a 
different, slick and clinging white paint, some of it applied by a 
roller and some boldly by a brush.  The conspectus of the walls to 
left and right is almost as monochrome white, nevertheless… 
 As the sun comes and goes the various kinds of radiation 
change level by a large factor, certainly to the point of 
discomfort—there are windows on three sides—and yet the walls 
remain white: brightness constancy, of course.  But, partly 
because of these shifts between direct strong light and diffused 
weak light on the monochrome walls, partly because of a special 
interest, I am very aware of being in an indescribably intricate 
ambience of microshadow.  It may usually be called texture, a 
word that somehow invokes the sense of touch, but it consists 
visually of almost pure shadow—very small self-shadows, derived 
shadows, and slant/tilt shadings…  It is almost purely from 
shadow that my visual access to the microstructure of the two 
plane surfaces of the walls derives.  I do not think stereopsy is 
helping much. 
 What I do not do, or would not be doing but for a special 
interest, is to attend to the individual microshadows as shadows 
or as objects of perception in their own right.  If I attend to part 
of a wall I get a sense of its surface quality and that seems 
enough.  Even with a special interest, it takes an effort of will, a 
decree of the mind, to attend to the same area of wall, to 
categorize its shadow types, and read the bearing of their lighting.  
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It is not an optical problem of acuity, in this strong light; rather, it 
seems to go against the grain of the perceptual process…10 
Baxandall is concerned with the question whether ‘we can 
[attend to individual shadows] and at the same time preserve 
the pattern of our more usual utilisation of the same shadow in 
the course of normal variously directed perception’.11  His 
concern is with the ways in which we can attend to shadows, the 
difficulty in doing so, and the ways in which our perception of 
our environment may subtly change as we do so.  In the 
description of his study, we are given familiar types of 
description of his surroundings, intermingled with observations 
about the existence and nature of certain types of shadow and 
visual phenomena, together with some technical commentary 
on the physical nature of the light array.  These three elements 
mingled together may give one a greater or lesser sense of what 
it must have been like for Baxandall glancing over his study and 
staring out at the countryside beyond.  The more one knows the 
kind of room discussed, the more one can link it with one’s own 
knowledge of what it must have been like; the more one follows 
Baxandall in attempting to attend to elements of the visual 
array, and discern the structure of shadows, the more one has 
the sense of what he has done, and how one can do it well or 
badly.  However, the passage is also a bravura display of how 
one might try to describe a visual scene combining such 
elements: Baxandall draws our attention at least as much to 
what he is reporting himself as doing and how he is reporting it, 
as to what he discerns; we have the sense of what it is like keenly 
to attend to the visual world, so as to discern various of its 
elements, and the difficulty and effort involved in drawing out 
the role of shadow in our visual perception of the world. 
 One might react to this passage by wondering what its 
bearing is on the question we are interested in, namely the 
nature of experience and our first person access to it.  One 
might think that while it tells us much, more than we wished to 
know, about what its author perceived that afternoon in the 
environment around him, it does not tell us about his 
experience.  But such a response, I suggest, would be wrong: 
what Baxandall does here, and reports himself as doing, is to 
                                                
10M. Baxandall, Shadows & Enlightenment (London: Yale University 
Press, 1995), pp.125-6. 
11 Op. cit. p.128. 
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attend to what it is like for him to look out at the world around 
him, and attend now to the objects he recognises, now to the 
shadows by which they come to be visually defined for him. 
 When we follow the passage and see some surface now 
as textured and now as covered in skein of shadows, we learn 
something not only about the object we are attending to but 
also how we learn things visually about that object.  The relation 
between the shadows and the texture seem to be ones which are 
forged within one’s experience.  It is this type of 
phenomenological fact which Baxandall focuses on.  For this 
reason, if we are to find anything which deserves the epithet of 
description of what it is like for one to see, then Baxandall’s 
account deserves such a title.  It is, of course, a fragmentary 
such account, offering only a limited such description, partial in 
what it highlights and what it omits, and undoubtedly in much 
of its description highly theory-laden.  None of that, I suggest, 
can take away from the clear sense a reader has, that what 
Baxandall does in the passage, and can be taken as intending to 
do, is describe his visual experience of the world, and not 
merely a description of the objects of perception.  But if it is a 
description of his experience it also has to be a description of 
the objects he perceives, or takes himself to perceive.  For what 
else could this feature be, if not an aspect of how the wall 
appears to one to be when one focuses on it now one way, now 
another? 
What does this tell us about how we know what our experiences 
are like, and what we thereby know?  First, the passage 
articulates much of what the experience is like, while at the 
same time leaving much unsaid, and perhaps unsayable.  So it 
would be a mistake to suppose that the character of experience 
is entirely ineffable.  Second, Baxandall indicates that he learns 
things about what it is like for him to view his study by paying 
careful attention in the way that he does to various features, and 
we the readers can certainly learn things not only about his 
inner life, but about our own, through reading the passage, and 
by following similar procedures.  Even if there is a sense in 
which the character of our own experience is somehow obvious 
to us, that should not be taken to preclude the possibility that 
we can make discoveries about what experience is like.  Third, 
and related to the above, learning about one’s experience can 
involve active exploration, primarily of the experienced world 
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around one, but in doing so of one’s experience as well.  Finally, 
correlative with the last, attending to what one’s experience is 
like cannot be separated from exploring and attending to 
features of the world as perceived. 
 This suggests that the way in which we learn what our 
experiences are like is by attending first to the objects and 
features which are presented to us in perception.  But there is an 
obvious problem with this suggestion: we can have perceptual 
experiences even when we are not perceiving anything in the 
physical world at all.  One might have induced a perfect visual 
hallucination of a red tomato, rather than simply having the 
pleasure of seeing one all by itself.  Furthermore, one might 
know full well that that is the position one is in.  In such a case, 
one would not be in a position to scan the elements of the 
physical scene before one, nor would one take oneself to be in 
that position.  Even in cases of hallucination, there is a way that 
one’s experience is for one, and one can come to know what 
one’s experience is like, yet there are no objects of perception 
for one to attend to. 
 Nevertheless, the basic model can still be applied even to 
this kind of case.  For, in as much as an hallucination may be 
indistinguishable for one from a genuine perception, it will still 
seem to one as if there is an array of objects there for one to 
scan and explore.  This will not necessarily be banished simply 
by the knowledge that one is suffering an hallucination, any 
more than the knowledge one is staring at a Müller-Lyer illusion 
is liable to make one see the lines as entirely equal in length.  So 
in such a situation, one can still be interested in aspects of one’s 
experience, and proceed to explore it by attending to the 
putative objects of awareness. 
 Note that the way we attend to our experiences when we 
reflect on them involves two distinct ways of attending.  One can 
attend to something simply in thinking about it, as when I 
attend to the average rainfall in August in thinking that it is less 
than ½ inch.  When one reflects on one’s own state of mind, one 
attends to it much as one attends to any object of thought.  In 
addition, we can attend to objects that we perceive in ways that 
we are not related merely by thinking about them. As you read 
along this line, you may note that there are words ahead of the 
one your eye rests on at the moment, and that there are lines 
above, and below this one.  Your eyes and your attention shift in 
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turn from one word to the next.  Now, as a whim, you might be 
inclined simply to turn your head away from the page to see 
what is going on in the world behind you.  In that case, you shift 
your attention to a feature of your environment of which you are 
not currently aware.  But, if you do not turn your head, but 
simply keep reading along the line, it may seem to you as if your 
attention is guided from the words that you now focus on, to the 
next set of words, by shifting among the features of which you 
are already aware.  To the extent that you shift your attention, as 
a matter of voluntary control, rather than having your attention 
shifted, as when some distraction occurs at the periphery of 
vision, you seem to have the choice of moving your attention 
among the range of things of which you are already aware.  So 
in perception, focal attention seems to range over objects which 
are already objects of awareness, and a motive for directing your 
attention to something, is to find out more. 
 Now in the case of reflecting on one’s own experience, 
one attends to one’s state of mind through directing one’s 
attention over the actual or putative objects of awareness.  
Whether one is perceiving or merely hallucinating, there is an 
apparent array of objects for one to direct one’s attention across.  
How things are as presented to one is surely one aspect of one’s 
current state of mind: indeed, in a case of hallucination, 
directing one’s attention to what is present will tell one nothing 
about what is present in one’s environment in a case of 
hallucination.  So, for this reason at least, exploiting perceptual 
attention is a way of coming to know about and attending to 
one’s own experience.  When one does so, one can’t conceive of 
what one directs one’s attention at as merely a property of one’s 
experience, the way one is affected.  For in directing one’s 
attention across a visual scene, one may chose to direct one’s 
attention to the feature on the left, rather than the one to the 
right.  What one selects among are the putative objects 
presented at various apparent locations.  But we do not think of 
our own experiences or their properties as spatially arrayed in 
this way.  So the only sense that we can make of what one 
intends to do in attending to one’s experience is that one does 
so through attending to things not taken to be merely properties 
of the experience. 
 As the Baxandall passage indicates, just such perceptual 
attention is exploited in coming to know about one’s visual 
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experience.  So one cannot in so attending take what one 
attends to simply to be a way of being modified, as the 
adverbialist conception of experience claims.  In as much as one 
exploits selective attention in learning about experience, such 
attention must range over the actual or putative objects of 
perception, and so attention to experience is not entirely distinct 
from attending to the objects of sense.  To this extent at least, we 
should side with Price and the sense-datum theorists and not 
their adverbialist opponents.  Of course, to attend to one’s own 
state of mind is not the same thing as attending to some aspect 
of the world one is interested in, but given that one’s state of 
mind has a certain subject-matter, one can attend to the state of 
mind, only by attending to that subject-matter.  In the case of 
sensory experience, that requires that one direct one’s attention 
at what is presented to one. 
 This point is revealed most clearly in the case of visual 
experience and other experiences, where its subject-matter is 
presented as spatially-arrayed.  For we clearly do not take 
entities arrayed spatially to be merely the properties of mind.  
But it also holds more generally.  We have here two contrasting 
conceptions of experience.  On the adverbialist conception, we 
are to think of experience as simply being a state of the subject, 
a way of being modified.  We are not to think of this event as 
intrinsically involving the presentation of anything to the 
subject, for that would be to import an ‘act-object’ conception 
of experience.  Instead, experience is to be a modification in the 
way that being thirteen stone is a way of being modified.  What 
marks the former out from the latter is just that this way of 
being is a way of being conscious.  The alternative conception of 
experience places much more weight on the subject of 
experience, and the subject’s viewpoint.  On that conception, to 
have an experience is to have a viewpoint on something: 
experiences intrinsically possess some subject-matter which is 
presented to that viewpoint.  To understand such experience 
and what it is like, one has to understand the viewpoint on that 
subject-matter, and hence also to attend to the subject-matter as 
presented to the viewpoint.12 
                                                
12 One can see Nagel’s famous discussion of consciousness and 
physicalism, T. Nagel,  ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, Mortal Questions,  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), as principally 
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 So, if we could really just think of our experiences as 
ways of being affected, where the awareness of a subject-matter 
was not intrinsic to being in such a state, then we would have no 
reason to reject an adverbialist conception of such states of 
mind.  However, when we think about sensory states such as 
visual experience, and more generally experiences of audition, 
smell, taste, even most bodily sensation, we cannot separate our 
knowledge of what it is like to be in that state from knowledge 
of the subject-matter presented to one in being in such a state of 
mind.  But that suggests for all such experience that our 
awareness of what the experience is like is inextricably bound 
up with knowledge of what is presented to one in having such 
experience.  To know what such experience is like is in part to 
know how things are presented to one as being. 
 Indeed, I would suggest, all of this can seem so obvious, 
once one thinks about it, that it should raise a problem of 
interpretation: how could anyone have plausibly put forward the 
adverbialist conception of experience as a serious option, given 
what we know of our experience?  There are, I suggest, two 
aspects to the explanation of this: on the one hand, adverbialists 
were driven by a desire to reject the metaphysical commitments 
of sense-datum theories of perception; if taking seriously what 
we introspect of our experience would commit one to the 
existence of non-physical objects, then they were prepared to 
reject the apparently obvious.  More insidious than this, though, 
the equivocation inherent in talk of ‘qualia’ which simply 
collapses the distinction between properties of being appeared 
to and properties apparent to one, simply obscures the 
inadequacy of the account. 
 
 
                                                                                                      
employing the second conception of experience—it is the role of a 
subject’s point of view within experience which explains why one must 
adopt a subject’s point of view to understand what his experience is 
like, cf. pp. 166, 172, 173-4.  In contrast, much of the discussion of 
the so-called ‘Knowledge Argument’ against physicalism tends to 
focus on the adverbialist conception of experience, where the focus on 
a subject’s own perspective comes in only at the level of thinking 
about one’s experience, and not in having the experience itself. 
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3.  We are now in a position to return to our initial task of laying 
out a common framework for the debate about the nature of 
experience and perceptual appearances. To know what one’s 
experience is like is to know what properties, aspects or features 
are presented to one in having the experience.  There seems to 
be no way to pick out the what it is like properties of the 
experiences without also picking out corresponding properties 
which objects may appear to have.  It is no surprise, then, to 
find that the term ‘qualia’ is happy to migrate between the two.  
Our first step should then be to replace such ambiguous 
terminology with an explicitly defined terminology which allows 
of no such slippage. 
 We need to keep track of two distinct things and pose 
the question how they are to be related.  On the one hand, we 
are concerned with states of mind, experiences, and how they 
can be the same or different from each other, in particular how 
they can be the same or different for the subject of such states: 
how it is for a perceiver when they are in one of these states 
rather than another.  When talking about this aspect of 
perceptual situations, we might talk of the phenomenal character, 
or phenomenal properties of the experience.  We shall use these 
terms strictly to apply only to experiences and their properties 
and not to the objects of experience and the properties they 
appear to possess.  When we need to talk of the latter, as the 
above discussion indicates we need to in understanding the 
phenomenal properties of experience, we shall instead talk 
about the presented elements or presented aspects of an experience. 
 With these terms in hand we can then state the 
conclusions of the last section as the keystone for our framework 
to the debate: reflection on sensory experience should lead one 
to accept that there are at least some phenomenal properties of 
experience which have corresponding presented elements, and 
our understanding of the phenomenal properties is dependent 
on our understanding of their presented elements.  On this view, 
difference in presented elements between two experiences will 
be sufficient for difference in their phenomenal properties.  
Note, incidentally, that Price commits himself to something 
much stronger in insisting on the diaphanous nature of 
experience: namely that sameness and difference of phenomenal 
properties just are sameness and difference in presented 
elements.  It is doubtful that this claim is true: why cannot the 
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ways in which things are presented in experience make a 
difference to what the experience is like, in addition to what is 
presented? 
 We should at this point address the principal worry 
which motivates an adverbialist conception of experience: when 
we introduce talk of the presented elements of experience, and 
make differences between phenomenal properties of experience 
turn on them, are we not simply re-introducing sense-data into 
our account of experience?  In seeing why not, we shall see how 
we are in a position to gain an overview of the whole debate.  If 
we are to do justice to a subject’s own point of view in having 
such experience, we need to fix on such presented elements; 
otherwise our account of experience will not be an account of 
what it is like for the subject of such experience to be so.  From 
the subject’s point of view, in both cases of perception and in 
cases of illusion and hallucination it certainly is as if there is 
something presented to her.  So we can’t do justice to that 
perspective without mentioning such a presented element in 
saying what the phenomenal character of her experience is.  If 
we fail to mention such things then, as we saw, we end up with a 
view of experience on which it is not intrinsically a way of being 
aware of things. 
 But in doing this we need not take ourselves necessarily 
to be committed to the actual existence of these elements.  For 
one might take a relaxed view of what the mention of a 
presented element in expressing the subject’s point of view in 
having experience should commit one to.  After all, we might 
think, in order to fix on young James’s state of mind we have to 
mention Santa Claus, saying that James has asked his aunt for a 
Buzz Lightyear doll, but Santa Claus for a playhouse.  At the 
very same time, we might simply add that James is more likely 
to be satisfied by his Aunt than Santa Claus, since at least the 
former but not the latter exists. 
 So too we might think in occupying the point of view in 
having an experience, we must act as if the elements presented 
or given are there.  If we are to attend to what our experience is 
like, we need to attend to the various aspects of the presented 
array, and to do so is to treat them as if they really do exist.  But 
in taking a certain distance from someone’s experience, even in 
a moment of disbelief our own, we may not suppose that there 
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really is anything answerable to what is presented to that point 
of view. 
 The key here is to realise that the thesis endorsed 
concerning the relation between phenomenal properties and 
presented elements is principally a claim about how we are to 
understand what experience is like for a subject, from the 
subject’s point of view.  To fix on what we are attempting to 
explain, what it is for one to have experience, we need to take 
seriously the first person point of view both in and on 
experience.  It is then a further move to explain the 
metaphysical commitments of such experience, and asking what 
it takes for there both to be points of view and for there to be 
things, presented elements, on which such points of view are 
points of view.  We can understand the fundamental debate 
about the nature of experience as a debate about these 
metaphysical commitments and the relation between 
phenomenal properties and presented elements. 
 Consider first the kind of intentional approach to 
perception which Dretske clearly favours.  One will think that it 
is clear that the kind of experiences we have are intrinsically 
states of awareness of mind-independent objects and properties.  
So, one will identify the presented elements of such experiences 
with things that can exist independently of whether one has 
such experience.13  At the same time, in insisting on the 
representational nature of experience, Dretske allows for the 
possibility that such experiences may be illusory or 
hallucinatory.  On this approach, one’s experience may have the 
relevant phenomenal property without its corresponding 
presented element actually being there.  We have here a two-way 
independence of presented elements and phenomenal 
properties. 
 On the other hand, we can interpret those philosophers 
who insist that there is a subjective aspect to perceptual 
experience as claiming that there are presented aspects of 
experience which could not exist independent of one’s 
awareness of them, but which at the same time are guaranteed 
to be instantiated just in case one does have an experience with 
the appropriate phenomenal properties.  Here we have the 
                                                
13 And in doing so, the theorist may claim to show how physical 
objects can be the direct objects of perception. 
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mutual dependence of presented elements and phenomenal 
properties. 
 We can see these different views, then, as disputing two 
questions.  On the one hand, they are concerned with what can 
be present to the mind: can the presented elements in 
experience exist independently of our awareness of them?  On 
the other hand, they are concerned with the manner or mode in 
which objects are presented to one in having experience: can the 
presented elements of experience be so presented as not to 
require their actual existence for one’s experience to be so.  
Indeed, we can think of these two questions as defining for us a 
complete set of options for the kinds of phenomenal property in 
question, depending on the mutual dependence of presented 
elements on phenomenal properties: 
 
     Is it possible to have: 
Phenomenal Property & 
     Not  Presented Aspect? 
 Yes No 
Yes Intentional Naïve  
No Dependent Subjective 
Is it possible to have: 
Presented Aspect & 
Not Phenomenal  
Property? 
 
 
Note that this generates four possible kinds of phenomenal 
property.  For, one might agree with a defender of the 
intentional theory of perception that the presented elements of 
experience include the very mind-independent objects in the 
world around us which we take ourselves to perceive, and in 
that case that such presented elements can exist without one 
having the relevant experience.  On the other hand, one might 
suppose, consonant with a sense-datum theory, that such 
experience really can only occur if its object really does exist, 
and hence that one can have an instance of the relevant 
phenomenal property only if its presented element exists.  This 
possibility is marked in the matrix by the top right hand box: 
naïve phenomenal properties, as might call them.14  Likewise, 
                                                
14 Of course, one might think that the existence of illusions and 
hallucinations are enough to show that there cannot actually be any 
experiences with such phenomenal properties.  Whether such 
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one might think that while the subject-matter of experience 
could not exist independent of one’s experience, and so its 
presented elements could not be instantiated without 
corresponding phenomenal properties, nevertheless the 
experience itself would not be sufficient to guarantee the 
existence of that subject-matter.  This possibility is reflected in 
the bottom left box, labelled dependent phenomenal properties. 
 The debate about experience has tended to focus simply 
on the intentionality and subjectivity of experience, and hence 
on only two of these four properties, intentional phenomenal 
properties and subjective phenomenal properties in the terms of 
our matrix.15  Furthermore, those who insist on the 
intentionality or representational nature of experience have 
tended to emphasise its world-directedness: that the presented 
elements of our experiences are trees, tables and chairs which 
are there whether we experience them or not.  But that aspect of 
experience is not sufficient to show that experience has 
intentional phenomenal properties rather than naïve ones.  
Likewise, arguments for the existence of subjective phenomenal 
properties which attempt to show that there is more to what 
experience is like than how the external world is presented to 
be, cannot show by that that there are subjective phenomenal 
properties rather than that there are either subjective or 
dependent ones.  One moral to draw from this discussion is that 
the debate in the literature has been drawn in terms which are 
too narrow.16  This gives us yet further evidence that the 
                                                                                                      
arguments from illusion really establish that conclusion turns in part 
on how one assesses so-called disjunctive theories of perception as 
presented in P. F. Snowdon, ‘Perception, Vision and Causation’,  
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (1980-81),, J. McDowell, 
‘Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge’,  Proceedings of the British 
Academy, (1982), H. Putnam, ‘The Dewey Lectures’,  Journal of 
Philosophy XCI, (1994). 
15 Cf. C. Peacocke, Sense & Content(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 
Ch.1, particularly the definition of sensational properties on p.5; G. 
Harman,  ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical 
Perspectives 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.) : Ridgeview Publishing Co, 1990); S. 
Shoemaker, ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”‘,  Philosophy & 
Phenomenological Research 64, (1994),249-314. 
16 Note that the possession of any one phenomenal property does not 
exclude the possibility of having any of the others: so this generates 
fifteen possible accounts of perception.  The discussion in the 
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supposed obviousness of the terms of debate about subjective 
experience and qualia is nothing of the sort.  We cannot hope to 
make proper progress on the debates about consciousness and 
the metaphysics of the mind until we have a better 
understanding of the issues surrounding perceptual experience 
and appearances. 
 The problem with which we started was that of finding 
some common ground between parties disputing what is 
supposedly just obvious to us.  When that debate is framed 
simply in terms of the existence of qualia, or purely subjective 
qualities of experience, the problem is liable to seem intractable.  
But, I argued, such difficulties arise from the confusion inherent 
in the debate about qualia, with its almost unavoidable 
equivocation in the term.  This we traced back to the 
adverbialist response to sense-data.  The idea of experience 
merely as a mode of being affected by the world arises from the 
desire to avoid the metaphysical extravagances of sense-data, 
but it achieves metaphysical austerity only at the cost of leaving 
out of its conception of experience what seems to be essential to 
any account of what experience is like, that experience has a 
subject matter.  Once we reject this misconception, we are then 
better placed to find the common ground between different 
views: they all do wish to hold onto a common conception that 
what experience is like is a matter of what is present to the 
mind.  The differences between sense-datum theories of 
experience and intentional accounts of perception are 
disagreements about what can be set before the mind, and how 
it can be so set.  These matters take us well beyond that which is 
simply obvious to one from reflection on one’s own visual or 
                                                                                                      
literature tends to focus solely on two or three of these: those which 
appeal purely to intentional phenomenal properties, cf. G. Harman,  
‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives 4, J. 
Tomberlin (ed.) : Ridgeview Publishing Co, 1990), and those who 
think that there must be a mixture of phenomenal and subjective 
properties, cf. C. Peacocke, Sense & Content(Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983), Chs. 1 & 2; there are a few defenders of purely 
subjective accounts of experience, for example, F. Jackson, Perception: 
A  Representative Theory(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977). 
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auditory experiences.  The question that remains is how we are 
to settle these disputes.17 
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